Detta är en HTML-version av en bilaga till begäran om allmän handling 'Digital Services Act / Digital Markets Act'.

 10 March 2021
Digital Markets Act 
Oliver Bethell, Legal Director, Google
Thomas Graf, Partner, Cleary Gottlieb

Our objectives
● We support efforts to protect openness and consumer choice on the Internet
● We hope for a regulatory environment that:
○ Defines clear objectives
○ Sets out rules that are commensurate to those objectives
○ Provides proportionate safeguards against unintended consequences

Potential for unintended consequences: Search ranking 
We support rules that ensure that ranking is free from manipulation.  But Recital 49 could be read as 
going beyond that goal and banning all differentiated treatment
Article 6(1)(d)
Recital 49 
Gatekeepers must “refrain from treating 
Gatekeepers should not engage “in any 
more favourably in ranking” their own 
form of differentiated or preferential 
products and services compared with 
treatment in ranking” for “all forms of 
third-party products and services and 
relative prominence, including display, 
apply fair and non-discriminatory 
rating, linking or voice results
conditions to such ranking” 

A rigid equal ranking rule would damage result quality   
The DMA should clarify that it does not 
preclude legitimate differentiation of results  

● Rules on ranking should distinguish between 
artificial different treatment that has no merit vs. 
legitimate differentiation that has benefits  
● By drawing this distinction, the rules can preserve 
the benefit of useful formats (like a map in response 
to a query for a location) while preventing harmful 

Potential for unintended consequences: Interoperability
Article 6(1)(f)
Gatekeepers must enable “interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features
Scope is not well specified 
Scope should be limited more clearly to OSs in line 
with stated concern  

Recital 52 identifies concerns only with regard to 
● Interoperability obligation for OSs makes sense 
because OSs are by design meant to operate with 3P 
gatekeepers’ possible  “dual role as developers of 
operating systems and device manufacturers
● But the same obligation may create problems for other 
products because they are not designed for 
● By delineating the scope of the interoperability 
But Article 6 applies to a gatekeeper “in respect of 
obligation to OSs, regulatory rule can address the 
each of its core pla orm services” and Article 6(1)(f) 
stated concern while avoiding adverse consequences  
does not seem to be limited to OSs

Potential for unintended consequences: Search data disclosure
Article 6(1)(j)
Gatekeepers must provide 3p search service with access to anonymized “ranking, query, click and view 
” generated by end users when they search
Current provision is disconnected 
Current provision does not account 
from a competitive need
for risks from disclosure
● Disclosure obligation is not bounded 
● Risk to privacy: Anonymization is 
by any demonstrable competitive 
insufficient to protect privacy
need for data that must be disclosed 
● Risk of manipulation: Disclosing 
● Search data and search services are 
search data enables bad actors to 
singled out for sharing with rivals  in 
reverse engineer and manipulate 
contrast to all other types of data 
and platforms, without obvious 
● Risk to innovation: Disclosing 
search data enables rivals to copy 
Google’s results and dulls incentives 
to innovate

Provide for a general safeguard against adverse consequences
Some provisions in Art 6 contain 
Selective safeguards do not 
General safeguard prevents harm 
safeguards, while others don’t
protect against dangers
without undermining objectives
Article 6(1)(c) provides safeguard 
● Presence of safeguards in some 
● Need not involve competition-type 
provisions attests to the 
efficiency analysis
against danger to “integrity of the 
potential for unintended 
hardware or operating system
● But would consider substantiated 
and concrete harm, e.g., security, 
● But it is hard to predict all 
quality, functionality, privacy
possible risks ex ante
● There would be no delays because 
● Lack of safeguards in other 
gatekeeper would bear burden of 
provisions is inconsistent with 
But Article 6(1)(f) has no safeguard 
equality and proportionality
even though the dangers are the 
same or greater

Giving full effect to Art. 7(7) 
Recitals 33 and 58 envisage regulatory dialogue to ensure effectiveness and proportionality of the 
regulatory rules.  This dialogue is meant to take place via Art. 7(7) 
But Art. 7(7) suffers from limitations
Resolving the limitations to Art. 7(7)
● Make clear that firms that notify will 
● Even if a firm notifies under Art. 7(7) it 
not be exposed to fines
remains exposed to fines 
● Apply Art. 7(7) to Art. 5 or move 
● This means firms have no incentive to 
complex provisions (e.g. Art. 5a and 
5g) from Art. 5 to Art. 6
● Art. 7(7) does not apply to Art. 5 
obligations, even though compliance 
may be complex (eg Art. 5a - data 
processing; Art. 5g - fee transparency)