This is an HTML version of an attachment to the Freedom of Information request 'Digital Services Act / Digital Markets Act'.

Europe’s media sector, represented by the undersigned organisations, welcomes the Commission’s proposal 
on the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as a much needed and urgent step towards establishing a fair, balanced and 
contestable digital market. 
A  combination  of  lax  regulation,  harmful  and  unfair  practices  by  Gatekeepers,  and  ineffective  European 
competition remedies, means that a handful of global players have used their monopoly positions to become 
the  Gatekeepers  to  the  digital  economy.  Gatekeepers  drive  the vertical  integration within  the wider  media 
ecosystem, using platform policies to squeeze independent media businesses and locking out new entrants, 
extracting revenues from  the creative ecosystem through monopoly rents, that would otherwise be reinvested 
in production and media plurality. 
We therefore welcome the European Commission’s proposal to adopt an internal market instrument, with 
its much-needed ex-ante regulatory approach. This is vital to address the harmful practices of gatekeepers 
through the imposition of mandatory obligations and prohibitions. This Proposal is a clearly targeted and sound 
document which acknowledges the need to control the conduct of digital gatekeepers in order for digital 
markets to remain fair and contestable. This is why the media sector strongly believes that it is imperative 
that the Proposal is not watered down as it goes through the European Parliament and the Council. However, 
we consider that certain amendments can be made to the Proposal in order to ensure that the DMA will be a 
comprehensive instrument that captures and effectively addresses harmful – existing and potential future – 
conducts of gatekeepers.
It is essential that the scope remains tightly focused, as proposed by the European Commission, to the 
gatekeeper platforms whose size, reach and exercise of monopoly power justify the prohibitions and 
obligations enshrined in the DMA proposal. In our view, the Commission’s proposal strikes the right balance in 
restricting the scope to the entities it seeks to capture. We are concerned that, if the DMA targets a group of 
platform services that is too broad - or that could be quickly broadened over time - the material obligations 
may be diluted and the enforcement may be slowed down, without additional benefits. There is an important 
correlation between the threshold for regulating a service and the intensity of such regulation. An effective 
control of the immense powers of genuine Gatekeepers to structure today’s digital economy requires intensive 
oversight,  as  such we would  suggest  that  the  co-legislators  abstain  from  attempts  to widen  the  scope  of 
the proposal.  However, we believe that the list of core platforms services should include web browsers, as 
defined by the European Commission in its Android decision1, and clarify that the term “operating system”, 
as defined in Article 2(10), includes operating systems for any “smart” (internet connected) TVs, speakers and 
voice assistants. This will ensure that rules in Articles 5  and 6 apply to all activities where gatekeepers control 
access to online audiences - including content intermediation.

Recent profit announcements by the biggest gatekeeper platforms demonstrate how rapidly they are using 
their monopoly positions to extract revenues from markets in which they operate 2.  The scale of these profits 
is abnormal, prompting  an urgent need for the harmful market practices identified to be banned before any 
remaining competition to these platforms is eliminated. It is crucial that the obligations foreseen in Articles 
5  and  6  apply  as  soon  as  possible  after  adoption  of  the  Regulation.  We  caution  against  any  attempt  by 
gatekeepers or other entities, to delay the application of the obligations. As such, we call for the obligations 
to be directly applicable to Gatekeepers after designation and to ensure that the regulatory dialogue does 
not  have  a  suspensive  effect  on  the  obligations  foreseen  in  Articles  5  and  6.  In  addition,  we  recommend 
that  interested  stakeholders,  including  consumer  organisations,  should  have  the  right  to  participate  in  the 
regulatory dialogue, as they often are victims of the practices that the DMA seeks to address. 
Opt-in for personal data combination
The DMA should include a prohibition on Gatekeepers from combining and using data for their own purposes. 
Currently Article 5(a) prohibits the bundling of data from various sources only if the user does not consent to 
such combination in the sense of an opt-in. When dealing with Gatekeepers, such a solution could instead 
render the provision empty of any substance. By nature, the gatekeepers’ position gives them critical leverage 
to offer incentives or force users into consenting to certain data processing operations 3. Therefore, the ban 
on combining personal data sourced from a gatekeeper’s core service with personal data from other services 
should be strengthened and apply irrespective of the end user’s consent to effectively address gatekeeper’s 
data power. 
Access to data generated by intermediating between end users and business users 
Article  6(1)i  has  the  potential  to  resolve  many  competitive  issues  that  currently  exist  in  the  digital  market. 
Access to data generated by media content is an essential requirement for all industries which have a digital 
presence. However, currently, the obligation to share personal data is connected to the gatekeeper’s capacity 
to obtain consent for data sharing. Given the experiences that our industries have with consent management, 
relying on the gatekeepers to manage consent would empty the obligation of any meaning. Gatekeepers 
should be incentivized to facilitate the obtention of end-users’ consent for sharing data with business users, 
for instance by limiting Gatekeepers’ capacity to re-use the data collected if business users cannot equally 
access it. 
Audience measurement
We  welcome  the  provision  on  audience  measurement  in  Article  6(1)g,  however,  in  order  for  it  to  ensure 
meaningful access to information for the media sector we would insist on the need for granular, reliable and 
transparent information; independently verified by trusted, approved and neutral third parties.

Unfair bundling and tying of services
The proposed DMA prohibit bundling practices that require a user to subscribe to or register with one service 
in order to use another service (Article 5(f)). Such approach falls short of addressing equally unfair bundling 
practices which do not focus on subscription/registration such as: i) forcing business users to offer content 
on a subscription-based core platform service as a condition to make that content equally available on the 
free version of that core service, or ii) proposing aggressive multi-product rebates (or mixed bundling 4) which 
hamper competition even from the most efficient companies in their field. To effectively address leveraging 
before markets have ‘tipped’, this provision should cover the tying of one gatekeeper service with another core 
service for which the undertaking does not yet enjoy a gatekeeper position.
Self-preferencing & third-party favouritism
A  ban  on  self-preferencing  in  ranking  as  foreseen  in Article  6.1.d  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  the well-
functioning of the digital single market. The DMA proposal however only prohibits giving preferential treatment 
to own services in ranking but does not prohibit giving preferential treatment to selected third parties. We 
indeed  believe  that  gatekeeper  platforms  are  able  to  circumvent  the  prohibition  of  self-preferencing  by 
favouring  selected  services  and  partners,  thus  creating  the  same  anticompetitive  effects  for  competitors 
and undermining the free choice of the user. We therefore recommend that the ban on self-preferencing 
is  extended  to  selected  third  parties. Additionally,  this  provision  must  apply  beyond  search  engines  to  all 
core  platform  services  operated  by  designated  gatekeepers;  it  should  also  be  extended  to  cover  other 
self-preferencing practices that go beyond ranking. This includes ensuring that users are accurately and 
impartially directed to the content they have requested via the gatekeeper platform’s electronic programme 
guide or voice activated ranking services, instead of being directed to the platforms’ own competing services. 
Moreover, the algorithms which underpin the discoverability of content must be transparent. 
Fair and non-discriminatory general conditions of access
The  principle  foreseen  in Article  6(1)k  is  limited  to App  stores. We  recommend  that  in  order  to  ensure  the 
effectiveness of the DMA, the obligation must be applied beyond App stores to all core platform services, in 
particular to search engines and social networks. 
The DMA therefore must prohibit gatekeepers from imposing unfair conditions, such as the granting of a 
royalty-free  license,  demanding  data  that  is  not  necessary  to  provide  the  intermediation  service,  or  tying 
the ability of users to exercise statutory remuneration rights to their participation in platform services. The 
accompanying  Recital  57  which  already  provides  –  although  only  for  App  Stores  -  that  pricing  or  other 
general  access  conditions  are  unfair,  in  particular  if  they  provide  an  advantage  for  the  gatekeeper  that  is 
disproportionate  to  the  intermediary  service,  must  also  cover  the  scenario  whereby  a  Gatekeeper  would 
make the access to the gatekeeper platform dependent on a free licence for rights or for the transfer of 
data. This is vital to ensure Europe can maintain its core objectives of cultural diversity, media pluralism and 
competitiveness  which  benefits  European  citizens.  Therefore,  article  6.1k  should  be  expanded  to  include 
an obligation refraining Gatekeepers from inserting sponsorship and advertising around third party content, 
without the express consent of the content provider. 
Gatekeepers should be obliged to negotiate on fair and non-discriminatory terms, for the use of content on 
their core platform services. In the event of a dispute about the conditions of access for business users to 
core platform services pursuant to Article 3(7), the Commission should have the option to impose specific 
procedures, including through binding codes of conduct to govern aspects of the gatekeepers’ relationship 
with business users, for instance through arbitration to contribute to the proper application of the Regulation.